Box 6: Regaining perceptions of control Anne: The reason I started to collect information was that I felt the need to control things again. Because I had the feeling that I had lost control, control about life, about my life, about my health and my body. I believed that when I would know more about my disease, about where it came from, and whether there were things I could do to help myself , I would feel more in control about my own situation again. So, I set to find out what information was available about breast cancer. I wanted to read everything I could find about breast cancer. I read about survival rates and treatment options for my particular situation, and I was busy trying to learn as much as I could about my disease, my prognosis, and my treatment options. I think it was really important for me to do that, because it made me feel that I could exert some control over the situation.
Introduction
In the course of disease and treatments, cancer patients are confronted with manifold psychosocial stresses (Faulkner et al., 1994; Klee et al., 2000; McDaniel et al., 1995; Greer & Silberfarb, 1982) . Focusing on radiotherapy (either as primary or adjuvant treatment), prevalence rates of psychological distress (i.e., anxiety and depressive symptoms) vary considerably among studies (Stiegelis et al., 2001) . Some global trends, however, can be found. Using cut-off scores to indicate levels of anxiety and depression, cross-sectional studies found that, at the start of a course of radiotherapy, psychological distress is characterized by feelings of anxiety rather than by depressive symptoms (De Graeff et al., 1999; Maher et al., 1996; Wallace et al., 1993) . Interestingly, when assessing psychological distress during the course of radiotherapy, most cross-sectional studies found lower levels of anxiety, but higher levels of depressive symptoms compared to pre-treatment levels. However, longitudinal studies revealed the highest level of distress prior to patients' first treatment with both anxiety and depressive symptoms gradually decreasing over time (Bye et al., 1995; Lamszus et al., 1994; Munro & Potter, 1996; Stiegelis et al., 2001) . In addition, a number of studies compared radiotherapy with other cancer treatments and found no or only few differences in psychological distress (Fowler et al., 1996; Lim et al., 1995; Litwin et al., 1995; Schain et al., 1994; Stiegelis et al., 2001) .
Despite the difficulties associated with cancer, many studies have determined that cancer does not inevitably lead to problems in psychological well-being, and many patients have demonstrated the capacity to cope with cancer while maintaining overall quality of life (Andrykowski et al., 1996; Carpenter, 1997; Cella & Tross, 1986; De Haes & Knippenberg, 1985; Dougherty et al., 1986; Jahkola, 1998; Lepore & Helgeson, 1998; Litwin et al., 1995; Vinokur et al., 1989) . These studies are of particular interest because samples of less severely ill patients or healthy references from the general population were included as a comparison group. For example, Hann, Jacobsen, Martin, Azzarello, and Greenberg (1998 b ) found that after radiotherapy, breast cancer patients reported an overall quality of life similar to that of women of the same age with no history of cancer. In addition, a meta-analytical review of 58 studies indicated no significant differences between cancer patients and healthy references drawn from the general population with respect to anxiety and general psychological distress ( Van 't Spijker et al., 1997) .
There are several theoretical explanations for why patients may show a sense of psychological well-being that is comparable to that of individuals who are not confronted with serious health threats. Helson's adaptation level theory, response shift phenomena, Bradburn's theory of internal alteration of norms, and Taylor's theory of cognitive adaptation all suggest that people may use a number of cognitive strategies to counteract the negative impact of distress on well-being (Bradburn, 1969; Breetvelt & Van Dam, 1991; Helson, 1964; Taylor, 1983) . In the present study the focus is on Taylor's cognitive adaptation theory because (1) many researchers explained their findings by using this theory (e.g., Andrykowski et al., 1993; Fromm et al., 1996; Hagopian, 1993; Petrie et al., 1999; Vickberg et al., 2001) , while research on the theory is limited and (2) it holds interesting concepts (i.e., optimism, control, and self-esteem) that when proved to be adaptive cognitions can be influenced by effective interventions.
The theory of cognitive adaptation is based on the assumption that people possess unrealistically positive views of themselves to enhance their well-being. For example, most people hold positively biased ideas about the future, think they have a smaller chance to get sick and think they are less vulnerable in threatening situations than others (Harris & Middleton, 1994; Taylor, 1989; Weinstein, 1987) . Linking these positive illusions of 'normal' individuals to the chronic illness population, Taylor (1983) posits that mildly positive self-relevant distortions enable individuals:
(1) to develop an optimistic outlook, (2) to regain mastery over the event, and (3) to restore their self-esteem in response to stressful events, such as a diagnosis cancer. She showed that, independent of prognosis, many of the patients she interviewed made efforts to control their disease. These efforts consisted of cognitive control strategies, such as positive thinking and meditation, as well as behavioral control strategies, such as making dietary changes designed to decrease the likelihood of developing cancer. In addition, Taylor, Lichtman, and Wood (1984) found that those patients who (1) were able to find meaning in the experience, (2) felt a sense of control, and (3) restored self-esteem were emotionally better adjusted than those who lacked these perceptions. Other studies revealed that the three aspects of cognitive adaptation theory (i.e., optimism, control, and self-esteem) were positively related to adjustment for both college students and patients with coronary heart disease (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Helgeson, 1999) . Still, only Taylor (1983) herself investigated all three components of the theory of cognitive adaptation among cancer patients, simultaneously. To examine whether cancer patients indeed show mildly positive self-relevant distortions, one should compare their levels of optimism, control, and self-esteem with that of a group of healthy references from the general population. It is obvious that a cancer diagnosis threatens optimism about the future, feelings of control, and self-esteem since patients have little opportunity to influence the progression or recurrence of this impairing and life threatening disease (Thompson et al., 1993) . However, the finding that patients show similar levels of optimism, control, and self-esteem as healthy references would suggest that patients are successful in maintaining these cognitions and, thus, support the theory of cognitive adaptation. In support of cognitive adaptation theory, the few studies that have addressed this issue reported no differences between patients and healthy individuals. However, they were mainly focused on self-esteem (Carpenter, 1997; Cella & Tross, 1986; Dougherty et al., 1986; Foltz, 1987; Vinokur et al., 1989) . The first purpose of the present study is to examine differences between cancer patients and healthy individuals in all three cognitive responses included in cognitive adaptation theory.
A next interesting question is: "If patients do develop cognitive adaptation strategies, what happens when these cognitions are threatened during the cancer process?" That is, if patients try to control their side effects by, for example, thinking of the side effects as temporary, these cognitions may be disconfirmed when the side effects persist. The disconfirmation of cognitions may in turn lead to emotional distress. Nevertheless, Taylor & Armor (1996) have implied that individuals who have the ability to develop these positive cognitions in the first place are able to cognitively adapt to setbacks and adjust psychologically better than those who do not employ these cognitive strategies. However, research regarding patients' perceptions of optimism, control, and self-esteem at different stages of the cancer process is scarce, particularly concerning optimism and control (Miller et al., 1996) . Regarding self-esteem, research has mainly focused on breast cancer patients and yielded inconsistent findings. For instance, one study revealed that almost 50% of the respondents reported retrospectively that their self-esteem had increased following diagnosis and treatment, whereas another longitudinal study revealed that patients treated with mastectomy plus adjuvant treatment reported a poorer selfesteem at the end of the first year as compared to the initial assessment three months after surgery (Carpenter, 1997; Penman et al., 1986) . Therefore, our second purpose was to examine changes in the components of cognitive adaptation theory over time for cancer patients as well as healthy references.
Consistent with cognitive adaptation theory, research in both healthy populations and populations suffering from chronic disease has revealed a positive relationship between optimism, control, and self-esteem, on the one hand, and psychological well-being, on the other hand (Bjorck et al., 1999; Burgess et al., 1988; Khoo & Bishop, 1997; Miller et al., 1996; Scheier & Carver, 1987; Thompson & Collins, 1995; Thompson & Spacapan, 1991) . Unfortunately, most studies used a crosssectional design, which makes it impossible to examine the predictive nature of optimism, control, or self-esteem on psychological well-being. Therefore our final purpose was to investigate whether optimism, control, and self-esteem predict future psychological distress in both groups.
In conclusion, the present study was conducted to address the limitations of previous studies. Our study (a) focused on all three components of cognitive adaptation theory simultaneously (b) included a group of healthy references drawn from the general population, and (c) had a longitudinal design with fixed assessment points in time. We examined the following research questions; (1) Are patients at least as optimistic and do they perceive at least as much control and self-esteem as healthy references?; (2) Are patients, as compared to healthy individuals, able to maintain similar or even higher levels of optimism, control, and self-esteem during radiotherapy as well as three months after radiotherapy?; and (3) Do lower levels of optimism, control, and self-esteem predict future depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety?
Methods

Procedure
As part of a larger longitudinal study on cancer patients coping with radiation therapy, newly diagnosed cancer patients were approached for participation in the current study by their radiotherapist (Van der Zee et al., 1998a) . Patients were treated for 4-7 weeks in three hospitals in the northern part of the Netherlands and the majority (90%) received treatment with a curative intention. They were informed face-to-face about the purpose of the study and their consent to participate was sought. Participation was not restricted on the basis of cancer site, stage of disease, or on the basis of any demographic variables. Patients completed written questionnaires at home at three intervals: (1) at one week prior to the beginning of radiation therapy, (2) two weeks after completing therapy, and (3) three months after radiation therapy. The reference group was selected from the register office of five townships in the same region as patients. Participation was requested by mail. These individuals without cancer from the general population were matched at group level on age and gender with the patient group. The healthy references also completed questionnaires at three assessment points with the same intervals as patients.
Subjects
There were 111 cancer patients and 73 healthy references who agreed to participate in the study. During the course of the study 11 patients were excluded from the study because they completed their questionnaire several weeks after they had started radiotherapy. Furthermore, only those patients and healthy references who completed all three assessments were included. Complete data on the measures for this study were obtained from sub-samples of 67 and 50 individuals, respectively. The other 33 patients and 23 healthy references had missing data on several instruments or dropped out of the study. Comparisons of T1 variables were made between the patients and references included in the present study and the patients and healthy references for whom data was missing on later assessments. Patients who remained in the study did not significantly differ on demographic, medical, and psychological variables from those who were excluded. Comparisons between healthy reference subjects in the present study and those who dropped out also revealed no significant differences on demographic and psychological variables.
Measures
All measures that are used in the present sample are well validated in prior to research and commonly used within research on cancer patients as well as on healthy references drawn from the general population (Bouma et al., 1995; Curbow & Somerfield, 1991; Hann et al., 1998b; Helgeson, 1999; Miller et al., 1996; Scheier & Carver, 1985) .
Optimism. The Life Orientation Test (LOT) was used to assess dispositional optimism, defined as generalised optimistic outcome expectancies (Scheier & Carver, 1985) . It consists of eight items and yields a total score between 0 and 32. Half of the items are phrased optimistically and half are phrased pessimistically. An example of an item includes "I always look on the bright side of life." Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they agree with the items on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 "strongly disagree" to 4 "strongly agree". The negative items were reversed before scoring so that, higher scores indicate higher levels of dispositional optimism. The LOT has been shown to have adequate to excellent levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Scheier & Carver, 1985) . In the present study, Cronbach's alpha ranged from .69 to .76.
Mastery. We employed Pearlin and Schooler's Mastery Scale (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978) which consists of seven items that are intended to assess global beliefs of perceived control or beliefs regarding one's ability to control an event rather than being controlled by fate. Five items are phrased in a positive way and two items in a negative way (negative items were reversed scored). A sample item from this scale is: "I have little control over the things that happen to me." Possible responses were given on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 5 "strongly agree". A total sum score was calculated. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher levels of perceived control. Cronbach's alpha for the Mastery scale in the present sample ranged from .71 to .76 at the different assessment points.
Self-esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem List (RSE) (Rosenberg, 1965) was used to measure self-esteem. This questionnaire consists of 10 items which measure attitudes toward the self, such as self-acceptance and self-worth. For example: "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself." Each of the 10 items was rated on a fourpoint scale ranging from 1 "strongly disagree" to 4 "strongly agree". The five negatively phrased items were reversed scored and summed to yield an overall selfesteem score. Higher scores on the RSE indicate higher levels of self-esteem. Cronbach's alpha for the current study ranged from .75 to .79.
Depressive symptoms. We used the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) which is a 20 item self-report scale to measure depressive symptomatology (Bouma et al., 1995) . Respondents rated the degree to which they have experienced each depressive symptom during the past week on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 "rarely or none of the time" to 4 "most or all of the time". Total scores range from 0 to 60. The item scores were summed into a single measure with a higher score reflecting a higher level of depressive symptomatology. The CES-D has been shown to have good psychometric properties. The internal consistency of the CES-D in the current study ranged from .87 to .92.
Feelings of anxiety. We used the state (current) anxiety subscale of the State-trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al., 1969) . This scale consists of 20 items. For each item, respondents indicated, on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 "not al all"
to 4 "almost always", how often they feel each symptom of anxiety. Sum scores can range from 20 to 80. The scores on items were summed into a single measure with a higher score reflecting a higher level of anxiety. Cronbach's alpha was .95 at all assessment points.
Results
Descriptives
Demographic characteristics of the patients and healthy references are presented in Table 1 . Both the patient (60% female) and reference group (56% female) consisted of more female than male subjects. The average age of the patients was 58.7 (SD = 12.6) years, whereas the mean age of the reference group was 60.3 years (SD = 13.0). Most participants of the patient group suffered from breast cancer (N = 32), prostate cancer (N = 14), or head and neck cancer (N = 6). Time since diagnosis ranged from one to nine months with an average of eight weeks. Using student's ttest and Chi-square analysis, we found no significant differences between the cancer patients and the healthy references on demographic variables. Optimism, control, and self-esteem. To test our first research question, we used student's t-tests to examine mean differences in optimism, control, and self-esteem between the two groups. Levels of optimism and self-esteem were significantly higher for the patient group as compared to the reference group at all three assessment points. Control did not significantly differ between both groups. The means and t-values are presented in Table 2 .
Comparisons between both groups and changes over time
In order to examine our second research question regarding changes over time, repeated measures of analysis of variance were performed with group (i.e., patient or reference group) as a between-subjects variable and time (i.e., T1/T2/T3) as a within-subjects variable. Repeated measures revealed no significant main effects of time (F-value < 1), nor were there any interaction effects (i.e. group x time) (F-value < 1). This indicates that, on a group level, optimism, control, and self-esteem are stable for the patient group as well as for the reference group (see Table 2 ).
Depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety. T-tests yielded no significant differences between the patient group and the reference group in the mean of depressive symptoms prior to treatment or at two weeks and three months after radiation therapy. Nor were there any group differences with respect to feelings of anxiety (see Table 2 ). For depressive symptoms, repeated measures showed no effect of time (F-value < 1) and no differences between both groups in the pattern of change over time (T1 to T3) (F-value = 3.34). Interestingly, there was an interaction effect of group x time for anxiety, F(1, 114)= 4.27, p < .05. Further analyses showed a significant linear decrease in the mean score of anxiety in the patient group, F(1, 66)= 3.96, p < .05, whereas the reference group showed no significant changes in feelings of anxiety over time. Note. *** p ‹ 0.001; ** p ‹ 0.01; * p ‹ 0.05. a Comparisons between patients and healthy references on optimism, control, self-esteem, depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety at different assessment points
Correlations
Pearsons' correlations coefficients were computed for both groups separately to examine the associations among the key demographic variables, optimism, control, self-esteem, depressive symptoms, and feelings of anxiety at T1. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3 . First, regarding demographic variables of the patient group, only education was significantly related to self-esteem. A higher education was associated with a higher level of self-esteem (r = .29). The other demographic variables were not associated with the three variables derived from cognitive adaptation theory. In the healthy reference group, men had higher scores on optimism and self-esteem (r = -.34 and (N= 50) and those below are from the patient group (N=67). ** p ‹ .01; * p ‹ .05 a 1 = male, 2 = female; b 1 = partner, 2 = no partner r = -.38, respectively) than women. In addition, a lower age (r = -.35) and having a partner (r = -.31) were significantly associated with higher levels of control. Furthermore, among both groups the demographic variables were found to be unrelated to depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety. Second, all three constructs of optimism, control, and self-esteem were significantly correlated among each other in the patient group as well as the healthy reference group, with the exception of optimism and control in the healthy reference group.
Finally, except for the relationship between control and depressive symptoms in the healthy reference group, we found moderate to strong significant correlations between all three cognitive perceptions and depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety.
Predictors of depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety at three months after treatment
To test our third research question concerning the prediction of psychological distress at three months after radiotherapy by optimism, control, and self-esteem, several hierarchical regression analyses for the total sample (i.e., patients and healthy references) were conducted. First, demographics were tested for inclusion as control variables. Because the demographic variables were not significantly correlated with the outcome variables (i.e., depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety), demographic variables were not controlled for in the analyses. In the regression analyses, baseline measures of the outcome of interest (i.e., either depressive symptoms or feelings of anxiety at T1), group (dummy score: 1 = patient group, -1 = healthy reference group), and one of the cognitive responses (i.e., optimism, control, or self-esteem) at baseline were entered in the first step. To examine whether the relationship between, for example, depressive symptoms three months after radiotherapy and baseline optimism differs for patients and healthy references, the interaction between group and the cognitive response variable was entered in the second step. The interaction between group and the baseline measure of the outcome of interest was also entered in the second step. In total, we performed six analyses (i.e., three cognitive responses x two outcome variables). To avoid multicollinearity among predictors and the interaction terms, we computed the multiplicative functions as the products of the 'centered' scores (i.e., centered around zero) on the component variables (Aiken & West, 1991) .
In all the analyses, the interaction effects failed to reach significant levels. This indicates that the relationship between optimism, control, and self-esteem, on the one hand, and feelings of depression and anxiety, on the other hand, did not differ between both groups. Therefore, the analyses were repeated without the interaction Note. Baseline distress concerns depressive symptoms or feelings of anxiety at T1 The standardized regression weights concern the final step in regression analyses *** p ‹ 0.001; ** p ‹ 0.01; * p ‹ 0.05.
terms, again for the total sample. Table 4 reports the results of these latter multiple regression analyses on depressive symptoms and feelings of anxiety. After controlling for depressive symptoms at T1, control significantly predicted depressive symptoms at T3, whereas optimism and self-esteem did not. Thus, higher levels of control were predictive of lower levels of depressive symptoms. Regression analyses for feelings of anxiety showed that after adjustment for the initial level of anxiety at T1, both optimism and control made significant contributions to the explanation of feelings of anxiety. However, feelings of anxiety were not significantly predicted by self-esteem. This indicates that higher perceptions of control and optimism both predicted lower levels of anxiety.
Discussion
The most striking finding of the current study was that patients reported greater optimism and higher levels of self-esteem compared to healthy references. These results provide a tentative positive answer to our first research question reading "are patients able to cognitively adapt by maintaining or developing levels of optimism, control, and self-esteem that are at least equal to those of healthy references?" Our second question, concerning changes over time, was answered completely in the affirmative. Optimism and self-esteem remained at a higher level for the patient group, whereas control did not differ between the groups over time. That is, patients were able to maintain their efforts to cognitively adapt during the entire treatment process up till three months after completing radiotherapy. Finally, although Taylor & Brown (1988) suggested direct effects of optimism, control, and self-esteem on psychological well-being, our results revealed that only control and optimism predicted feelings of anxiety. Control also significantly explained depressive symptoms at three months after treatment.
Because prior studies concerning differences between cancer patients and healthy references on optimism, control, and self-esteem are limited, it is difficult to compare our results with those of other researchers. However, the higher levels of cognitive responses (i.e., optimism and self-esteem) in the patient group as compared to the healthy reference group is consistent with studies showing that individuals can experience positive effects in response to threatening event such as cancer (Collins et al., 1990; Petrie et al., 1999; Scheier et al., 1989) . In fact, cancer patients have often reported that, irrespective of their prognosis, their lives had been changed for the better (Andrykowski et al., 1996; Fromm et al., 1996; Maher, 1982; Taylor, 1983; Taylor et al., 1984) . One possibility is that patients are capable of focusing on their personal strengths and assets rather than the cancer's threatening nature. In turn, this may help them to protect self-esteem and to remain optimistic about the future.
One process related to cognitive adaptation might be social comparison (Taylor, 1983) . Research has found that patients yield a preponderance of downward comparisons (Van der Zee et al., 1996; Wood et al., 1985) . That is, patients often seem to compare themselves with others who are worse off than they are. For instance, Wood et al. (1985) found that 80% of 78 breast cancer patients reported that they adjusted better than other women with breast cancer. Studies have shown that comparisons with fellow patients who were doing worse also contributed to patients' psychological well-being (Van der Zee et al., 1996) . For example, Hagedoorn, Sneeuw, and Aaronson (2002) found that, in spite of physical declines, patients who used downward comparisons were able to endure their overall quality of life. This was not found for patients who compared themselves to similar others. These social comparison processes may counteract the negative impact of distress on well-being (Affleck et al., 2001) . In the present study, patients were under active treatment, indicating daily visits to the clinic for several weeks. These daily visits may have given patients plenty opportunity to compare their own situation with that of other patients and to make downward comparisons.
Several limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting our results. First, because we had included a heterogeneous group of cancer patients, we were not able to look at differences on cognitive responses and psychological distress between patients who were diagnosed with different tumor sites. However, based on Taylor's theory of cognitive adaptation, no differences would be expected between patients diagnosed with different tumor sites. Furthermore, the relationship between cognitive responses on the one hand, and psychological distress, on the other hand, has also been found in other groups of chronic illnesses and among healthy individuals (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992) . Thus, there is no reason to believe that this relationship would differ dependent on cancer diagnosis (Helgeson, 1999) . Future research could replicate our findings by comparing different tumor sites or by focusing on only one cancer site. Second, the majority of patients in the present study had a good prognosis, which could account for the finding that perceptions of optimism, control, and self-esteem were at least as high as that of the group of healthy references. Yet, previous literature has revealed that even patients with a worse prognosis show some attempt to cognitively adapt (Taylor, 1983; Taylor & Armor, 1996) . Third, when making comparisons with a healthy reference group, we assume that the cognitive responses and levels of distress of these references reflect a level of cognitive responses and distress that is "normal" in the population. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case. To test our assumption, the scores of the healthy references on the instruments used in our study were compared with the scores of healthy references on the same instruments in other studies and no differences were found (Bouma et al., 1995; Hann et al., 1998b; Miller et al., 1996) . For instance, it has been shown that the mean score for depressive symptoms of the CES-D is 9 for women and 7 for men, which is very similar to what we found (i.e., ranging from 8.38 to 9.43, with more women than men in the reference group). Fourth, we have a small sample size that limits generalisations to other populations. Finally, we used global measures to examine optimism, control, and self-esteem. Questionnaires aimed at measuring optimism, control, and self-esteem specifically related to the radiotherapy might have led to other outcomes. However, Helgeson (1999) developed three situation-specific measures of optimism, control, and self-esteem and found that these three measures were closely correlated with the three global measures of optimism, control, and self-esteem.
To conclude, our heterogeneous sample of cancer patients suggests that positive cognitions may be seen in many patients irrespective of cancer site or stage of disease. The question remains whether all patients adapt by developing cognitive strategies (Taylor & Armor, 1996) . To understand which individuals are able to maintain or develop positive beliefs in the face of continuous threatening events, future research should investigate individual differences in these positive cognitions. Intervening in those patients who have more difficulty to form positive cognitions could be valuable for reducing their psychological distress. For instance, patients who are low on control might benefit from information on ways to handle their feelings of lack of control. As the three aspects of cognitive adaptation theory might be susceptible to changes, longer follow-ups may give insight into questions such as whether positive cognitions are still important long after treatment.
Box 7: Cognitive adaptation
Henry: I must say that one of the things that drives me crazy is the whole process of having to wait. Having to wait to get an appointment. Having to wait to get your results. But how am I doing now? At this moment my future appears hopeful. Off course, there are days when you think about death and the fear runs through you, but mostly you are caught up in the day to day treatment. I have a kind of uncertainty hanging over me, but it is largely overcome by my natural optimism. I figure I will not die yet, because I'm still too busy with everything and I have to keep my wife company (laugh) . So, as long as I keep that attitude, I figure I'm gonna get to that 104 that I want to be, that I've always thought that I would be.
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